Continuous Behavioural Function Equilibria and Approximation Schemes in
  Bayesian Games with Non-Finite Type and Action Spaces by Guo, Shaoyan et al.
Continuous Behavioural Function Equilibria and Approximation
Schemes in Bayesian Games with Non-Finite Type and Action
Spaces
Shaoyan Guo
School of Mathematical Sciences, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
(syguo@dlut.edu.cn)
Huifu Xu
School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Southampton, SO17 1BJ, Southampton, UK
(H.Xu@soton.ac.uk)
Liwei Zhang
School of Mathematical Sciences, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
(lwzhang@dlut.edu.cn)
April 17, 2018
Abstract. Meirowitz [17] showed existence of continuous behavioural function equilibria for
Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces. A key condition for the proof of the
existence result is equi-continuity of behavioural functions which, according to Meirowitz [17,
page 215], is likely to fail or difficult to verify. In this paper, we advance the research by present-
ing some verifiable conditions for the required equi-continuity, namely some growth conditions
of the expected utility functions of each player at equilibria. In the case when the growth is
of second order, we demonstrate that the condition is guaranteed by strong concavity of the
utility function. Moreover, by using recent research on polynomial decision rules and optimal
discretization approaches in stochastic and robust optimization, we propose some approximation
schemes for the Bayesian equilibrium problem: first, by restricting the behavioural functions to
polynomial functions of certain order over the space of types, we demonstrate that solving a
Bayesian polynomial behavioural function equilibrium is down to solving a finite dimensional
stochastic equilibrium problem; second, we apply the optimal quantization method due to Pflug
and Pichler [18] to develop an effective discretization scheme for solving the latter. Error bounds
are derived for the respective approximation schemes under moderate conditions and both aca-
demic examples and numerical results are presented to explain the Bayesian equilibrium problem
and their approximation schemes.
Key words. Bayesian game, behavioural function equilibrium, equi-continuity, polynomial
decision rules, rent-seeking contest
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, there has been an increasing attention to Nash games with private
information. A common assumption in such games is that the prior distribution of the types
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of all players is known in public, each player has complete information of its own type which
determines its utility function but is unaware of its rival’s type. Based on the prior information,
each player chooses a response function which is also known as behavioural function defined
over its type space under Nash conjecture and an equilibrium arising from this kind of game is
known as Bayesian Nash equilibrium, see Hansanyi [14] for a comprehensive original discussion
of the Bayesian games where private information might also include other aspects of a player’s
payoff function.
Meirowitz [17] considered a Bayesian game where each player chooses its behavioural func-
tion based on maximization of its expected utility with the expectation being taken w.r.t. its
rival’s distribution of types conditional on the selection of its own type. Under some conditions,
he established existence of equilibria for the Bayesian game using Schauder’s fixed point theo-
rem. One of the main conditions that Meirowitz used for the existence result is equi-continuity
of the behavioural functions which is elicited to ensure that the space of behavioural functions is
closed and the operator mapping the set of behaviour functions to itself is compact. Meirowitz
commented that the equi-continuity condition is likely to fail or difficult to verify in practi-
cal applications. Athey [2] considered a class of Bayesian games where the types are drawn
from an atomless joint probability distribution and each player’s utility function has so-called
single crossing property which means whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy
in the sense that higher types choose higher actions, a player’s best response strategy is also
nondecreasing. Under these circumstances, she demonstrated existence of equilibria in every
finite-action game with each player’s behavioural function being nondecreasing and step-like.
Moreover, when the space of actions is continuous, she showed existence of a sequence of non-
increasing step-like (behavioural function) equilibria to finite action games that converges to
an equilibrium with the continuum-action which means that an equilibrium in continuous ac-
tion spaces can be approximated by a sequence of nondecreasing step-like behavioural function
equilibria in finite action spaces.
Ui [24] provided a sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium by regarding it as a solution of a variational inequality where the payoff gradient of
the game is defined as a vector whose component is a partial derivative of each players payoff
function with respect to the players own action. He demonstrated that when the Jacobian matrix
of the payoff gradient is negative definite for each type, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists using
some theories in variational inequality rather than Schauder’s fixed-point theorem. Note that
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium considered by Ui [24] is slightly different from Meirowitz’s where
a player’s behavioural function is optimal almost surely for its type. This means the behavioural
function is not necessarily optimal at a subset of its type set with Lebesgue measure zero. In some
references, this kind of equilibrium is called pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), see [10, 12].
Of course, the behavioural functions at such an equilibrium are not necessarily continuous.
A particular interesting application area of the Bayesian equilibrium model is Tullock’s rent-
seeking contest [22, 23]. A rent-seeking contest is a situation where players spend costly efforts
to gain a reward. Many conflict situations can be described by rent-seeking contests including
political campaigns, patent races, war fighting, lobbying efforts, labor market competition, legal
battles and professional sports, see Fey [12] and references therein. Fey showed existence of
symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the case when there are two players in the contest. Ewerhart
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[10] advanced the research by showing existence of a unique PSNE where the contest success
function is of logit form with concave impact functions and player’s private information may
relate to either costs or valuations.
Aghassi and Bertsimas [1] discussed a broad class of robust games with finite number of
players, each player plays a mixed strategy over a finite set of pure strategies and the optimal
response is based on the worst payoff matrix. In particular, they investigated robust games
with private information where each player’s behavioural function is based on the worst type
and worst payoff matrix. Under some conditions, they established existence of robust equilibria
using a fixed point theorem due to Bohnenblust and Karlin [7]. A key element in the existence
theorem is compactness: the set of behavioural functions must be compact and the mapping
which takes each behavioural function to a subset of the behavioural functions is compact and
convex set-valued. By Arzela-Ascoli’s theorem (see [17]), the latter compactness is fulfilled if
and only if behavioural functions in the image space are bounded and equi-continuous.
In this paper, we extend the research in two directions. First, we derive verifiable sufficient
conditions for equi-Lipschitz continuity of the behavioural functions, a key condition used by
Meirowitz [17] for showing the existence of an equilibrium. This might help to make his model
and the equilibrium results more applicable. Second, we apply the well-known decision rules for
calculating an approximate behavioural function equilibrium. The fundamental idea is to restrict
the behavioural function of each player to polynomial functions of certain order. In doing so,
we will be able to effectively converting the Bayesian game into a finite dimensional stochastic
game model which can be solved by existing stochastic approximation methods such as sample
average approximation method and optimal quantization method. The approach is known as
polynomial decision rules in the literature of stochastic optimization and robust optimization,
see for instances Bampou and Kuhn [5] for the polynomial decision rules applied to continuous
linear programs and Kuhn, Wiesemann and Georghiou [16] for linear decision rules applied to
distributionally robust formulation of two stage stochastic programs.
As far as we are concerned, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows.
• We revisit the existence results established by Meirowitz [17, Proposition 1] for the Bayesian
game by replacing the explicit assumption of equi-conituity of the behavioural functions
with some growth conditions of the expected utility functions of each player at equilibria
(Theorem 3.2). The new existence result is derived by using a general stability result in
parametric programming (Lemma 3.1). In the case when the growth is of second order, a
sufficient condition is given (Proposition 3.1). Moreover, when the utility functions of all
players are directionally differentiable and satisfy certain monotonicity conditions, with
respect to their actions, we demonstrate uniqueness of the Bayesian equilibrium (Theorem
3.4).
• We propose to use polynomial decision rules to derive an approximation of the behavioural
functions and hence the Bayesian behavioural function equilibria. This is possible when
we concentrate on the continuous Bayesian equilibrium model (Theorem 3.3). Under the
approximation framework, we demonstrate existence of polynomial behavioural function
3
equilibria (Theorem 4.2) and show that solving a Bayesian polynomial behavioural func-
tion equilibrium is down to finding a finite dimensional stochastic equilibrium problem.
Convergence of polynomial Bayesian equilibrium to the true Bayesian equilibrium is es-
tablished to justify the polynomial decision rules. Moreover, we apply the optimal quanti-
zation approach due to Pflug and Pichler [18] to develop an effective discretization scheme
for solving the approximate Baygesian equilibrium model. Error bounds are derived for
the approximation schemes under moderate conditions and both academic examples and
numerical results are presented to explain the Bayesian equilibrium problem and their
approximate schemes (Theorem 4.3).
• We apply the proposed theory of existence and uniqueness of behavioural function equi-
librium and the approximation schemes to rent-seeking contests. Specifically, for general
symmetric multi-player games, we show that our conditions of existence and uniqueness
can be easily satisfied when each player’s effort is lower bounded by a positive number.
In other words, we can show existence and uniqueness of a continuous behavioural func-
tion equilibrium rather than a PSNE. Moreover, by driving the lower bound to zero, we
show that the sequence of the behavioural function equilibria has at least a cluster point
which is a continuous behavioural function equilibrium rather than a PSNE of the uncon-
strained contest where the player’s effort does not have a positive lower bound, slightly
strengthening Ewerhart’s earlier result [10, Theorem 3.4], see Proposition 5.1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a detailed explanation
of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium model, its equivalent formulations and key difference between
behavioural function equilibrium and so-called pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In Section 3,
we investigate existence and uniqueness of Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on new conditions
which sufficiently ensure behavioural function of each player to be equi-Lipschitz continuous. In
Section 4, we discuss approximation schemes for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium model, we start
with polynomial decision rules and then followed by optimal quantization schemes, convergence
results are derived to justify the approximations. Finally, in Section 5, we examine the estab-
lished theory and approximation schemes by applying them to rent-seeking contests and present
preliminary numerical test results.
2 The model
We consider a Bayesian game with n players. Each player possesses a preference utility function
denoted by ui(ai, a−i, θi, θ−i) for i = 1, · · · , n which depends on the player’s action ai, its rival’s
actions a−i, the player’s type θi and the rival’s type θ−i. We assume that a type θi takes values
from set Θi and an action ai takes values from action space Ai where Θi and Ai are non-empty,
compact and convex subsets of IRdi and IRzi respectively. Following the terminology of Meirowitz
[17], a profile of types is a vector θ = (θ1, · · · , θn) ∈ Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn and a profile of actions
is a vector a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ A := A1 × · · · × An. Using the standard notation, we denote by
a−i and θ−i respectively the vector of actions and the types of all players except i. Conditional
on its type θi, player i’s posterior belief about θ−i is represented by a conditional probability
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distribution ηi(·|θi), which describes the probability of player i’s rivals taking a particular type
θ−i.
Information on players’ types is private which means each player only knows its own type
but not other’s. However, it is assumed that the probability distribution of θ, denoted by η(θ), is
public information. This information describes the probability of all players taking a particular
θ which may be retrieved from empirical data. Throughout the paper, we will use θ to denote
a deterministic element of IRd1+···+dn or a random vector θ(ω) mapping from probability space
(Ω,B, η) to IRd1+···+dn depending on the context.
For i = 1, · · · , n, we denote by Fi the set of functions fi : Θi → Ai with the infinity norm,
that is
‖fi‖∞ = max
θi∈Θi
|fi(θi)|,
and Ci the set of continuous functions fi : Θi → Ai. Equipped with the infinity norm, Ci forms
a closed, bounded and convex Banach space. For the simplicity of notation, let
F := F1 × · · · × Fn, C := C1 × · · · × Cn, (2.1)
and N := {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 2.1 (Bayesian behavioural function equilibria) A behavioural function equi-
librium is an n-tuple f = (f1, . . . , fn) mapping from Θ1 × · · · × Θn to A1 × · · · × An such that
for every i ∈ N ,
(BNE) fi(θi) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi),∀θi ∈ Θi, (2.2)
where Θ−i := Θ1×· · ·×Θi−1×Θi+1×· · ·×Θn, ηi(θ−i|θi) is the conditional probability distribution
of θ−i, that is, ηi(θ−i|θi) = η(θ)/ηi(θi) and ηi(θi) is the marginal distribution of θi.
In the literature of Bayesian games, fi : Θi → Ai is called a behavioural function and conse-
quently a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is also called a behavioural function equilibrium, see [1, 14]
and references therein. Throughout this paper, we will use both terminologies interchangeably
for the equilibrium.
Note that there are a couple of alternative formulations for (BNE). If we let
ρi(ai, f−i, θi) :=
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi), (2.3)
then we can reformulate (BNE) as
(NE) fi(θi) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ρi(ai, f−i, θi), ∀θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ N, (2.4)
or equivalently
ρi(fi(θi), f−i, θi) ≥ ρi(gi(θi), f−i, θi),∀θi ∈ Θi, (2.5)
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for every gi ∈ Fi, i ∈ N . Consequently we may investigate existence of behavioural function
equilibrium of (BNE) by looking into (NE). For each f ∈ F , define
Ψ(f) :=
{
(y1(·), · · · , yn(·)) ∈ F : yi(θi) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ρi(ai, f−i, θi),∀θi ∈ Θi, i ∈ N
}
. (2.6)
A sufficient condition for the well-definedness of Ψ(f) is compactness of Ai as well as continuity
of ρi in ai for i ∈ N . On the other hand, if ui is concave and continuously differentiable w.r.t.
ai for i ∈ N , then f is a behavioural function equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following
variational inequality
0 ∈
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
∇aiui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi) +NAi(fi(θi)), ∀θi ∈ Θi, i ∈ N, (2.7)
where NX(x) denotes the normal cone of X at point x ∈ X. In what follows, we make a few
comments on the definition of behavioural function equilibria and alternative formulations.
1. We require (2.2) to hold for every θi ∈ Θi, i ∈ N . This differs from the Bayesian equilibrium
model recently considered by Ewerhart [10] and Ui [24] who require (2.2) to hold for almost
every θi rather than every θi which means that (2.2) may fail at a subset Θ
0
i of Θi with
ηi(Θ
0
i ) = 0. A behavioural function equilibrium defined in the “almost sure” sense is called
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE). The difference will have a significant impact on
conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria. We will come back to this in Sections
3 and 4. From the definition, we can see that a Bayesian behavioural function equilibrium
is a pure Nash equilibrium but not vice versa. Note that Meirowitz [17] does not make
it clear on this but we can deduce from context of his paper that his model also requires
(2.2) to hold for every θi.
2. We implicitly assume that maximum is attainable in each player’s maximization problem
(2.2). This is guaranteed when Ai is compact and the expected utility function of each
player is lower semi-continuous w.r.t. its action variable. It is possible to replace the
compactness condition with inf-compactness of the utility functions but we don’t want the
additional technicality to distract our focus on the key ideas.
3. An individual player may have multiple global optimal solutions, denoted by A∗i (θi), for
some type values θi, in that case, fi(·) is understood as a measurable selection in the
sense of Aumman [4] from the set-valued mapping A∗i : Θi → Ai. Moreover, we implicitly
assume that ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) is integrable with respect to ηi(θ−i|θi) over Θ−i. A
particularly interesting case is that fi is continuous on Θi. We will focus on the case later
on.
4. The behavioural function equilibria are not necessarily continuous. Indeed, in some prac-
tical applications, there might be a reason for discontinuity rather than continuity, i.e.,
due to radical change of technology in power generation or marketing strategy of a new
product. Here we give an academic example with A∗i (θi) being multi-valued and (BNE)
has multiple discontinuous behavioural function equilibria.
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Example 2.1 (Multiple discontinuous behavioural function equilibria) Let u1(a, θ) =
a1a2θ1 and u2(a, θ) = a1a2θ2. Let A1 = A2 = [0, 10] and Θ1 = Θ2 = [−1, 1]. Assume that θ1
and θ2 are uniformly distributed over Θ1 and Θ2, and θ1 and θ2 are independent. We can easily
figure out a behavioural function equilibrium (f1, f2) with
f1(θ1) =

0 for θ1 ∈ [−1, 0),
[0, 10] for θ1 = 0,
10 for θ1 ∈ (0, 1],
(2.8)
and
f2(θ2) =

0 for θ2 ∈ [−1, 0),
[0, 10] for θ2 = 0,
10 for θ2 ∈ (0, 1].
(2.9)
Another behavioural function equilibrium is (f1(θ1), f2(θ2)) = (0, 0) for almost every (θ1, θ2) ∈
Θ1 ×Θ2.
To see this, it follows from the definition of behavioural function equilibrium, (f1, f2) is an
equilibrium if and only if
f1(θ1) ∈ arg max
a1∈[0,10]
∫ 1
−1
1
2
a1f2(θ2)θ1dθ2, ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1]
and
f2(θ2) ∈ arg max
a2∈[0,10]
∫ 1
−1
1
2
a2f1(θ1)θ2dθ1, ∀θ2 ∈ [0, 1].
Since ∫ 1
−1
1
2
a1f2(θ2)θ1dθ2 =
1
2
a1θ1
∫ 1
−1
f2(θ2)dθ2,
and if
∫ 1
−1 f2(θ2)dθ2 > 0, then f1(θ1) = 0 for −1 ≤ θ1 < 0, f1(θ1) ∈ [0, 10] for θ1 = 0, and
f1(θ1) = 10 for 0 < θ1 ≤ 1. Likewise, we can obtain f2(θ2) as defined in (2.9). If
∫ 1
−1 f2(θ2)dθ2 =
0, then we can verify that (f1(θ1), f2(θ2)) = (0, 0) for almost every (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ1×Θ2. Obviously,
(BNE) has multiple discontinuous behavioural function equilibria. Note that in this example,
we can see by the definition of PSNE that there are two PSNEs.
3 Existence of continuous behavioural function equilibrium
In this section, we discuss the case when each player’s behavioural function is unique and contin-
uous. The uniqueness and continuity mean that each player’s response is stable against variation
of its type (the behavioural function does not jump at any point of its domain). In particular,
we investigate conditions under which the behavioural function equilibria are equi-continuous.
The equi-continuity means that the derivatives of the player’s behavioural functions are uni-
formly bounded. This is a key condition that Meirowitz used in his existence theorem [17] and
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he commented the condition is unlikely to be satisfied or verified. From computational point of
view, the continuity allows us to develop efficient numerical schemes for solving (BNE), which
will be our focus in Section 4.
To this end, we need the following technical results about stability of a parametric program-
ming problem. To ease the notation, we will use ‖ · ‖ to denote the Euclidean norm in a finite
dimensional space and any norm in a Banach space throughout the paper.
Lemma 3.1 (Quantitative stability of optimal solutions in parametric programming)
Let Z be a Banach space equipped with norm ‖ · ‖, φ, ψ : IRm × Z → IR be continuous functions
and X ⊆ IRm be a compact set. Consider the following parametric minimization problems
min
x
φ(x, z)
s.t. x ∈ X, (3.10)
and
min
x
ψ(x, z)
s.t. x ∈ X, (3.11)
where z ∈ Z is a parameter. For z1, z2 ∈ Z, let X∗(z1) and X˜∗(z2) denote the set of optimal
solutions to (3.10) and (3.11) respectively with parameters z1 and z2. Then
(i) for any  > 0, there exists a constant δ > 0 (depending on ) such that when supx∈X |φ(x, z1)−
ψ(x, z2)| ≤ δ,
D(X˜∗(z2), X∗(z1)) ≤ , (3.12)
where D(B1, B2) := supb1∈B1 d(b1, B2) with d(b1, B2) = infb2∈B2 ‖b1 − b2‖;
(ii) if, in addition, there exist positive constants α and ν such that
φ(x, z1) ≥ min
x∈X
φ(x, z1) + αd(x,X
∗(z1))ν , ∀x ∈ X, (3.13)
then
D(X˜∗(z2), X∗(z1)) ≤
(
3
α
sup
x∈X
|ψ(x, z2)− φ(x, z1)|
) 1
ν
; (3.14)
(iii) if, further, φ(·, z) and ψ(·, z) are strictly quasiconvex, and there exists a positive constant
L such that
|ψ(x, z2)− φ(x, z1)| ≤ L‖z1 − z2‖, ∀z1, z2 ∈ Z,
and the growth condition (3.13) holds for all z ∈ Z, then X∗(z) and X˜∗(z) are singleton
for z ∈ Z (written X∗(z) = {x∗(z)} and X˜∗(z) = x˜∗(z) ) and
‖x˜∗(z2)− x∗(z1)‖ ≤
(
3
α
L‖z2 − z1‖
) 1
ν
. (3.15)
If ψ = φ, then (3.15) reduces to the equi-continuity of the solution mapping x∗(·).
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Proof. Part (iii) follows directly from Part (ii), so we only prove Parts (i) and (ii).
Part (i). Let  be a fixed small positive number and φ∗1 be the optimal value of (3.10) with
parameter z1. Define
R() := inf
{x∈X:d(x,X∗(z1))≥}
φ(x, z1)− φ∗1. (3.16)
Then R() > 0. Let δ := R()/3 and z2 be such that supx∈X |ψ(x, z2)− φ(x, z1)| ≤ δ. Then for
any x ∈ X with d(x,X∗(z1)) ≥  and for any fixed x∗ ∈ X∗(z1),
ψ(x, z2)− ψ(x∗, z2) ≥ φ(x, z1)− φ(x∗, z1)− 2δ ≥ R()/3 > 0,
which implies that x is not an optimal solution to (3.10) with parameter z2. This is equivalent
to d(x,X∗(z1)) <  for all x ∈ X˜∗(z2), that is, D(X˜∗(z2), X∗(z1)) ≤ .
Part (ii). Under condition (3.13), it is easy to derive that R() = αν . Let
 :=
(
3
α
sup
x∈X
|ψ(x, z2)− φ(x, z1)|
) 1
ν
.
From Part (i), we immediately arrive at (3.14). The proof is complete.
We follow the line of Meirowitz [17] to use Schauder’s fixed point theorem for proving exis-
tence of equilibria in (NE). To this end, we recall some relevant basic definitions and results in
functional analysis.
A set in a topological space is called relatively compact if its closure is compact. Let W
be a Banach space and T : W → W be an operator. The operator T is said to be compact
if it is continuous and maps bounded sets into relatively compact sets. The following result
characterizes relative compactness of a set in functional spaces. By the well-known Arzela-
Ascoli theorem, a set D ⊂ W is relatively compact if and only if the functions in D satisfy the
following two conditions: (a) uniform boundedness, that is,
sup
f∈D
‖f‖∞ <∞,
and (b) equi-continuity, i.e., for every  > 0, there exists a constant δ > 0 such that
sup
f∈D
‖f(s′)− f(s′′)‖ ≤ , ∀s′, s′′ with ‖s′ − s′′‖ < δ.
Thus, if K is a nonempty convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space V and T is a
continuous mapping of K into itself such that T (K) is contained in a compact subset of K, then
T has a fixed point. The following theorem precisely addresses this.
Theorem 3.1 (Schauder’s fixed point theorem, 1930) If M is a nonempty, closed, bounded,
convex subset of a Banach space and T : M → M is a compact operator, then T has a fixed
point.
We now return to discuss existence of continuous equilibria in (NE) and make the following
assumption.
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Assumption 3.1 Consider problems (BNE) and (NE). For i ∈ N , the following conditions
hold. (a) ui(a, θ) is continuous over A × Θ and for each f−i, θi, ρi(·, f−i, θi) is strictly quasi-
concave on Ai; (b) for a.e. measurable set S ⊂ Θ−i, ηi(S|θi) is continuous in θi; (c) there exist
positive constants α and ν such that
− ρi(a′i, f−i, θi) ≥ −vi(f−i, θi) + αd(a′i, A∗i (f−i, θi))ν , ∀a′i ∈ Ai, (3.17)
where vi(f−i, θi) := maxai∈Ai ρi(ai, f−i, θi) and A∗i (f−i, θi) = arg maxai∈Ai ρi(ai, f−i, θi); (d)
there exists a positive constant τi > 0 such that, for any ai ∈ Ai,f−i ∈ F−i and θi, θ′i ∈ Θi,
|ρi(ai, f−i, θi)− ρi(ai, f−i, θ′i)| ≤ τi‖θi − θ′i‖; (3.18)
and (e) Ai and Θi are compact and convex.
Assumption 3.1 (a) is used by Meirowitz [17], see conditions 2 and 3 in [17, Proposition
1]. It might be possible to weaken the continuity of ui in ai to lower semi-continuous but this
would incur more delicate analysis. Assumption 3.1 (b) and (e) coincide with conditions 5 and
1 respectively in [17, Proposition 1]. Assumption 3.1 (c) is newly introduced here. It requires
−ρi(a′i, f−i, θi) to satisfy some growth condition at A∗i (f−i, θi). In the case when γ = 2, this
assumption is known as the second order growth condition which is widely used in stability
analysis of parametric programming, see [8]. A sufficient condition for the latter is that ui is
strongly concave in ai uniformly w.r.t. other parameters, see Proposition 3.1. Assumption 3.1
(d) is also newly introduced here and requires ρi to be uniformly Lipchitz continuous in θi. This
condition may be weakened to Ho¨lder continuity and we assume Lipschitz continuity only for the
simplicity of presentation. Note that the condition is satisfied if ui is uniformly equi-Lipschitz
continuous in θi and the density function hi(·|θi) of ηi(·|θi) is Lipschitz continuous over Θi, see
Proposition 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 (Existence of continuous behavioural function equilibria) Consider prob-
lem (NE). Let Assumption 3.1 hold. Then (NE) has an equilibrium with the behavioural functions
being equi-continuous.
Proof. We use Theorem 3.1 to prove the result. Let C be defined as in (2.1) and Ψ be defined as
in (2.6). Note that C is a non-empty closed, bounded and convex set of a Banach space equipped
with the infinity norm. In what follows, we verify that Ψ : C → C is a compact operator.
Observe first that for each f−i ∈ F−i, Assumption 3.1 (a) and (b) ensure that the objective
function ρi(ai, f−i, θi) is continuous in ai and θi, and strictly quasi-concave in ai for each fixed θi.
Together with (e), we have A∗i (f−i, θi) being non-empty and a singleton. By classical stability
results (see e.g. [6, Theorem 4.2.1]), A∗i (f−i, θi) is continuous in θi, which means for any f−i ∈
F−i, A∗i (f−i, ·) ∈ Ci. Moreover, since ρi(ai, f−i, θi) is continuous in (f−i, θi), using the same
stability argument, we deduce that A∗i (f−i, θi) : C−i ×Θi → Ai is continuous.
On the other hand, under Assumption 3.1 (c) and (d), it follows from Lemma 3.1 that the
optimal solution of each maximization problem in (NE) is equi-continuous on Θi, that is,
|A∗i (f−i, θi)−A∗i (f−i, θ′i)| ≤
(
3τ
α
‖θi − θ′i‖
) 1
ν
, ∀θi, θ′i ∈ Θi, ∀f−i ∈ F−i, (3.19)
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where τ := maxi∈N{τi}. Since Θi is compact, for any small positive number δ, there exists a
finite number of points θ1i , · · · , θMi ∈ Θi such that for every θi ∈ Θi, there exists k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}
such that ‖θi − θki ‖ ≤ δ. Moreover, by the continuity of A∗i (f−i, θi), we may set f ′−i to be
sufficiently close to f−i with ‖A∗i (f ′−i, θki ) − A∗i (f−i, θki )‖ ≤  for k = 1, · · · ,K with  being a
sufficiently small number. By exploiting the equi-continuity of A∗i (f−i, ·), we have
‖A∗i (f ′−i, θi)−A∗i (f−i, θi)‖ ≤ ‖A∗i (f ′−i, θi)−A∗i (f ′−i, θki )‖+ ‖A∗i (f ′−i, θki )−A∗i (f−i, θki )‖
+‖A∗i (f−i, θki )−A∗i (f−i, θi)‖
≤ 2
(
3τ
α
δ
) 1
ν
+ 
and hence
sup
θi∈Θi
|A∗i (f ′−i, θi)−A∗i (f−i, θi)| ≤ 2
for δ ≤ α3τ
(

2
)ν
. This implies that A∗i (f−i, ·) : C−i → Ci is continuous for each i ∈ N and hence
Ψ : C → C is a continuous operator. Together with the compactness of A, this shows that Ψ is
a compact operator.
By Theorem 3.1, (NE) has an equilibrium. Moreover, it follows from (3.19) that the be-
havioural function equilibria are equi-continuous.
Note that the growth condition (3.17) is only a sufficient condition to ensure equi-continuity
of the behavioural functions. In some particular cases, equi-continuity condition may be derived
without such a condition, see for instances rent-seeking contests in [12]. We will come back to
this later on. The following proposition states that in the case when ν = 2, that is, the growth
is of second order, condition (3.17) may be derived from strong concavity of ui in ai.
Proposition 3.1 (Sufficient conditions for the growth condition) Suppose that for i ∈
N , ui(a, θ) is Lipschitz continuous over A×Θ and for each f−i and θ, ui(·, f−i(θ−i), θ) : Ai → IR
is strongly concave on Ai, i.e., there exists a positive constant σi such that
ui(ta
′
i + (1− t)ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) ≥ tui(a′i, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i) + (1− t)ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)
+
σi
2
t(1− t)‖a′i − ai‖2, ∀ai, a′i ∈ Ai, t ∈ [0, 1]. (3.20)
Suppose that A is a convex set. Then −ρi(ai, f−i, θi) satisfies the second order growth condition
(3.17) with ν = 2.
Proof. Observe first that the strong concavity of ui(·, f−i (θ−i), θi, θ−i) entails the strong
concavity of ρ(·, f−i, θi). This can be deduced from (3.23) by integrating on both sides of the
inequality with ηi(θ−i|θi) over Θ−i, i.e.,
ρi(ta
′
i + (1− t)ai, f−i, θi) ≥ tρi(a′i, f−i, θi) + (1− t)ρi(ai, f−i, θi)
+
σi
2
t(1− t)‖a′i − ai‖2, ∀ai, a′i ∈ Ai. (3.21)
Moreover, by [20, Theorem 23.1], the concavity and Lipschitz continuity imply directional differ-
entiability of ρi in ai. Subtracting both sides of the inequality by ρi(ai, f−i, θi) and then dividing
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by t and driving t to 0, we obtain
ρi(a
′
i, f−i, θi)− ρi(ai, f−i, θi) ≤ (ρi)′ai(ai, f−i, θi; a′i − ai)−
σi
2
‖a′i − ai‖2. (3.22)
On the other hand, the strong concavity in ai ensures that A
∗
i (f−i, θi) is singleton. By the first
order optimality condition of ρi at A
∗
i (f−i, θi),
(ρi)
′
ai(A
∗
i (f−i, θi), f−i, θi; a
′
i −A∗i (f−i, θi)) ≤ 0, ∀a′i ∈ Ai.
Combining the inequality (3.22), we obtain
ρi(a
′
i, f−i, θi)− ρi(A∗i (f−i, θi), f−i, θi) ≤ −
σi
2
‖a′i −A∗i (f−i, θi)‖2, ∀a′i ∈ Ai,
which indicates the second order growth of −ρi(·, f−i, θi) at A∗i (f−i, θi).
In the case when ui is continuously differentiable, condition (3.20) is equivalent to existence
of a positive constant σi such that for any fixed ai ∈ Ai
ui(a
′
i, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)− ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)
≤ ∇aiui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)T (a′i − ai)−
σi
2
‖a′i − ai‖2,∀a′i ∈ Ai. (3.23)
Condition (3.18) also plays a crucial role in Theorem 3.2. The proposition below shows that
the condition may be derived from Lipchitz continuity of ui in (a, θ) over A×Θ and the density
function of ηi(·|θi) is Lipschitz continuous over Θi. The latter is slightly strengthened from
Assumption 3.1 (b) which requires the density function to be continuous rather than Lipschitz
continuous.
Proposition 3.2 (Sufficient conditions for the validity of (3.18)) Assume: (a) ui is Lip-
schitz continuous over A × Θ with modulus κi; (b) the density function hi(·|θi) of ηi(·|θi) is
Lipschitz continuous over Θi with modulus γi, that is,
|hi(θ−i|θ′i)− hi(θ−i|θ′′i )| ≤ γi‖θ′i − θ′′i ‖,∀θ′i, θ′′i ∈ Θi, ∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i, (3.24)
for i ∈ N , and (c) A and Θ are compact. Then the uniform Lipschitz continuity condition
(3.18) holds.
Proof. By the definition of ρi, we have
|ρi(ai, f−i, θ′i)− ρi(ai, f−i, θ′′i )|
≤
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
∣∣ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θ′i, θ−i)− ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θ′′i , θ−i)∣∣ dηi(θ−i|θ′i)
+
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
|ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θ′′i , θ−i)(hi(θ−i|θ′i)− hi(θ−i|θ′′i ))|dθ−i
≤ κi‖θ′i − θ′′i ‖+ γi‖θ′i − θ′′i ‖
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
|ui(ai, f−i(θ−i), θ′′i , θ−i)|dθ−i
≤ (κi + γi∆i)‖θ′i − θ′′i ‖,
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where we set ∆i := maxa∈A,θ∈Θ |ui(a, θ)|
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i dθ−i. This shows condition (3.18) is fulfilled
with τi := (κi + γi∆i).
By the continuity of behavioural functions, the behavioural function equilibrium has an
alternative characterization.
Theorem 3.3 (Equivalent formulation of the BNE model) Let Assumption 3.1 hold. Then
f is a continuous behavioural function equilibrium of (BNE) if and only if it satisfies
Eη[ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] ≥ Eη[ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)],∀gi ∈ Ci, for i ∈ N, (3.25)
or equivalently
f ∈ arg max
g∈C
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)]. (3.26)
Proof. Under Assumption 3.1, we know from Theorem 3.2 that every behavioural function
equilibrium f of (BNE) is a continuous function on Θ. Moreover
Eη[ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] =
∫
Θi
{∫
Θ−i
ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)dηi(θ−i|θi)
}
dηi(θi),
where ηi(θi) is the marginal probability distribution of θi.
The “if” part. Let f ∈ C and f satisfies (3.25). We show that f is a behavioural function
equilibrium of (BNE). Assume for the sake of a contradiction that f is not an equilibrium of
(BNE). Then, there exist some i ∈ N and gi ∈ Ci such that for some θi ∈ Θi∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi) <
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi).
Here the deviation gi is picked up from Ci because every behavioural function of player i at
the equilibrium is continuous. Together with Assumption 3.1, the inequality above implies that
there exists a neighborhood Bθi of θi such that∫
Bθi
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi)dηi(θi)
<
∫
Bθi
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi)dηi(θi). (3.27)
Thus we can construct a continuous function g˜ such that g˜i(θi) satisfies inequality (3.27) for
θi ∈ Bθi and g˜i(θi) = fi(θi) outside the neighborhood. Then we have
Eη[ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] < Eη[ui(g˜i(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)],
which contradicts the fact that f satisfies (3.25).
The “only if” part. Let f be a behavioural function equilibrium of (BNE), we show that it
satisfies (3.25). This is obvious in that for any θi ∈ Θi∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi) ≥
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θi, θ−i)dηi(θ−i|θi).
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for i = 1, . . . , n and by integrating w.r.t θi on both sides of the inequality, we obtain (3.25).
We now turn to prove that the equivalence between (3.26) and (3.25). Let f ∈ C satisfy
(3.25). By summing up w.r.t. i on both sides of (3.25), we immediately obtain (3.26). On the
other direction, let f satisfy (3.26) but not (3.25). Then there exist i ∈ N and a continuous
function gi such that
Eη[ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] < Eη[ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)].
Let f˜ := (f1, . . . , fi−1, gi, fi+1, . . . , fn). Then
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] <
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(f˜i(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)],
which leads to a contradiction to (3.26) as desired.
Theorem 3.3 enables us to recast (BNE) as follows: an n-tuple f := (f1, · · · , fn) is a contin-
uous behavioural function equilibrium if
(BNE′) fi ∈ arg max
gi∈Ci
Eη[ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] for i ∈ N, (3.28)
or equivalently
(BNE′′) f ∈ arg max
g∈C
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)]. (3.29)
The reformulation is possible because we are restricting behavioural function equilibria of (BNE)
to continuous functions over Θ without affecting the nature of the problem under Assumption
3.1. This is one of the key reasons that motivates us to focus on continuous behavioural function
equilibria rather than general equilibria.
Note that we can easily find a counter example that the reformulation fails to work without
continuity of behavioural function equilibrium. To see this, let us revisit Example 2.1. In that
context, if
∫ 1
−1 f2(θ2)dθ2 > 0 and
∫ 1
−1 f2(θ2)dθ2 > 0, condition (3.25) can be written as(∫ 1
−1
f1(θ1)θ1dθ1
)(∫ 1
−1
f2(θ2)dθ2
)
≥
(∫ 1
−1
g1(θ1)θ1dθ1
)(∫ 1
−1
f2(θ2)dθ2
)
,
and (∫ 1
−1
f2(θ2)θ2dθ2
)(∫ 1
−1
f1(θ1)dθ1
)
≥
(∫ 1
−1
g2(θ2)θ2dθ2
)(∫ 1
−1
f1(θ1)dθ1
)
,
or equivalently ∫ 1
−1
f1(θ1)θ1dθ1 ≥
∫ 1
−1
g1(θ1)θ1dθ1 (3.30)
and ∫ 1
−1
f2(θ2)θ2dθ2 ≥
∫ 1
−1
g2(θ2)θ2dθ2 (3.31)
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for any (g1, g2) ∈ F1 × F2, where F1 and F2 are the set of measurable functions mapping from
[−1, 1] to [0, 10]. Let f∗1 (θ1) = 0 for θ1 ∈ [−1, 0) and f∗1 (θ1) = 10 for θ1 ∈ [0, 1] except at point
θ1 = 0.8 where f
∗
1 (0.8) = 8. It is easy to see that (f
∗
1 , f
∗
2 ) satisfies (3.30) and (3.31) but it is not
an equilibrium of (BNE). Indeed, we can revise the value of f∗i at a set of points with Lebesgue
measure zero without affecting its satisfaction to (3.30) and (3.31).
The importance of formulation (BNE′) compared to (BNE) is that each player’s expected
utility is defined as the expected value of its utility w.r.t. the joint probability distribution η(θ)
of the vector of type parameters θ rather than the conditional probability distributions ηi(θ−i|θi).
This brings substantial convenience when we discuss approximate schemes for solving (BNE)
in the next section. Formulation (BNE′′) allows us to look into the equilibrium problem from
optimization perspective. We will use both formulations interchangeably later on depending on
which one is more convenient to use in a context. In what follows, we use (BNE′′) to derive
conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4 (Uniqueness of equilibrium) Let Assumption 3.1 (b)-(e) hold. Assume: (a)
for i ∈ N , ui(a, θ) is Lipschitz continuous over A×Θ and concave in ai; (b) for any f ′, f ′′ ∈ C
with f ′ 6= f ′′,∫
Θ
n∑
i=1
[
(ui)
′
ai(f
′
i(θi), f
′
−i(θ−i), θ; f
′′
i (θi)− f ′i(θi)) + (ui)′ai(f ′′i (θi), f ′′−i(θ−i), θ; f ′i(θi)− f ′′i (θi))
]
η(dθ) > 0.
Then (BNE) possesses a unique equilibrium.
Proof. Note that condition (a) is strengthened from Assumption 3.1 (a) and hence under the
condition and the rest of conditions in Assumption 3.1, we know from Theorem 3.2 that the
(BNE) has an equilibrium. In what follows, we show the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Suppose
for the sake of a contradiction that there are two distinct behavioural function equilibria denoted
by f and f˜ . Then by condition (b),∫
Θ
n∑
i=1
[
(ui)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi)) + (ui)′ai(f˜i(θi), f˜−i(θ−i), θ; fi(θi)− f˜i(θi))
]
η(dθ)
> 0. (3.32)
On the other hand, following a similar argument to that in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we
know that both ui and ρi are directionally differentiable w.r.t. ai. Moreover, since −ui is Clarke
regular (see [9, Definition 2.3.4]), it follows from formula (4) in page 79 of Clarke [9] that
(ρi)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i, θi; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi)) =
∫
Θ−i
(ui)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi)).dηi(θ−i|θi).
Consequently, we have∫
Θ
n∑
i=1
(ui)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi))η(dθ)
=
n∑
i=1
∫
Θi
[∫
Θ−i
(ui)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi))dηi(θ−i|θi)
]
dηi(θi)
=
n∑
i=1
∫
Θi
(ρi)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i, θi; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi))dηi(θi) ≤ 0,
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where the last inequality is derived from the first order optimality condition of ρi at fi(θi).
Likewise, we can utilize the first order optimality condition of ρi at f˜i(θi) to establish∫
Θ
n∑
i=1
(ui)
′
ai(f˜i(θi), f˜−i(θ−i), θ; fi(θi)− f˜i(θi))η(dθ) ≤ 0.
Combining the two inequalities above, we obtain∫
Θ
n∑
i=1
[
(ui)
′
ai(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ; f˜i(θi)− fi(θi)) + (ui)′ai(f˜i(θi), f˜−i(θ−i), θ; fi(θi)− f˜i(θi))
]
η(dθ) ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction to (3.32).
In the case when ui is continuously differentiable in ai, condition (b) is equivalent to∫
Θ
[H(f ′(θ), θ)−H(f ′′(θ), θ)]T (f ′(θ)− f ′′(θ))η(dθ) < 0, (3.33)
for any f ′, f ′′ ∈ C,f ′ 6= f ′′, where H(f, θ) := (∇aiui(fi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ) : i ∈ N). Inequality
(3.33) means that H(·, θ) is diagonally strictly monotone in f over C.
At this point, it might be helpful to comment on the differences between the existence and
uniqueness results established by Ui [24] and our results. First, Ui demonstrated existence and
uniqueness of behavioural function equilibria by converting (BNE) into an infinite dimensional
variational inequality problem and showing that the latter has a unique solution when ui is
continuously differentiable in ai for i ∈ N , and H(·, θ) is strictly monotone and satisfies some
coerciveness condition, see [24, Proposition 2]. In other words, in his work, existence and unique-
ness are established in one go. Here we show existence and uniqueness separately and our proof
of existence is similar to Meirowitz’s proof which does not require continuous differentiability of
ui in ai or strict concavity of ui in ai; second, the behavioural functions at an equilibrium in [24]
are not necessarily continuous, and at an equilibrium (2.2) is required to hold for almost every θi
rather than for every θi, the latter allows Ui to establish an equivalence formulation analogous
to (3.25) without restricting the behavioural functions to be continuous functions. We retain
a proof for our uniqueness result since it is derived under a weaker condition than that in [24,
Proposition 2] and we have a different meaning of uniqueness. Third, it is possible to relax the
compactness of Θ and strengthen the condition on H(f, θ) by making it integrably bounded, we
leave interested readers to explore as it is not our main focus here.
To conclude this section, we use an example to explain the existence and uniqueness results
established in this section. Looking back Example 2.1, we find that all conditions in Assumption
3.1 are satisfied except the strict concavity condition. To amend this, we include a second order
term in each of the utility function to make them strictly concave. This motivates us to consider
the following example.
Example 3.1 (Uniqueness of continuous behavioural function equilibrium) Consider a
two player Bayesian game with utility functions u1(a, θ) = a1a2θ1−a21 and u2(a, θ) = a1a2θ2−a22,
action spaces A1 = A2 = [0, 10] and type sets Θ1 = Θ2 = [−1, 1]. Assume θ1 and θ2 are in-
dependent and uniformly distributed over Θ1 and Θ2 respectively. Then (BNE) has a unique
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equilibrium (f∗1 , f∗2 ), where
f∗1 (θ1) = 0 for θ1 ∈ [−1, 1],
and
f∗2 (θ2) = 0 for θ2 ∈ [−1, 1].
To see this, it follows from the definition of behavioural function equilibrium, (f∗1 , f∗2 ) is an
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies
f1(θ1) ∈ arg max
a1∈[0,10]
∫ 1
−1
1
2
a1f2(θ2)θ1dθ2 − a21, ∀θ1 ∈ [−1, 1] (3.34)
and
f2(θ2) ∈ arg max
a2∈[0,10]
∫ 1
−1
1
2
a2f1(θ1)θ2dθ1 − a22, ∀θ2 ∈ [−1, 1]. (3.35)
It is easy to verify that (f∗1 , f∗2 ) satisfies the above two conditions. To see that this is the only
solution, we note that since ai is restricted to take values in [0, 10],
∫ 1
−1 fi(θi)dθi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
Thus from (3.34), f1(θ1) = 0 for θ1 ∈ [−1, 0]. Likewise from (3.34), f2(θ2) = 0 for θ2 ∈ [−1, 0].
Moreover, for θ1 ∈ [0, 1], let α :=
∫ 1
0 f2(θ2)dθ2. If α > 0, then the optimal solution from (3.34) is
f1(θ1) =
1
4
αθ1, for θ1 ∈ [0, 1].
Substituting this to (3.35), we obtain
f2(θ2) =
1
32
αθ2, for θ2 ∈ [0, 1].
Substituting f2(θ2) back to (3.34), we obtain
f1(θ1) =
1
256
αθ1, for θ1 ∈ [0, 1].
Continuing the process, we deduce that f1(θ1) = f2(θ2) = 0 for θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, 1] in order for them
to satisfy conditions (3.34) and (3.35).
Note that the uniqueness can also be verified through Theorem 3.4. It is easy to calculate
that
H(f, θ) =
(
f2(θ2)θ1 − 2f1(θ1)
f1(θ1)θ2 − 2f2(θ2))
)
=
(
−2 θ1
θ2 −2
)(
f1(θ1)
f2(θ2)
)
.
Since the matrix at the right hand side of the equation is negative definite for every (θ1, θ2) ∈
[−1, 1]× [−1, 1], then H(·, θ) is diagonally strictly monotone.
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4 Approximation schemes for (BNE′′)
In this section, we move on to discuss approximation schemes for (BNE) which are ultimately
aimed to provide some numerical solution avenues for computing an approximate behavioural
function equilibrium. We do so via (BNE′′) as our focus is on those equilibria where the be-
havioural functions are continuous. Approximation is needed because (BNE′′) is an infinite
dimensional stochastic equilibrium problem which is in general difficult for us to obtain an exact
equilibrium unless the problem has a very simple structure as in Example 3.1. To this end,
we take two steps: (i) restrict the space of behavioural functions to polynomial functions and
consequently (BNE′′) reduces to a finite dimensional stochastic equilibrium problem; (ii) develop
discretization schemes for the stochastic equilibrium problem. The approach in step (i) is simi-
lar to the well-known polynomial decision rules which have been recently developed for solving
two-stage robust optimization problems [5] whereas the approach in step (ii) is well-known in
stochastic programming but it is not often to be used in stochastic equilibrium problems except
sample average approximation method [25]. In both approaches, we derive error bounds for the
approximated equilibria.
4.1 Polyhedral behavioural function for (BNE′′)
To ease the exposition of technical results, we confine ourself to the case that Θi ⊂ IR and
Ai = [ai, bi] ⊂ IR are compact intervals for i = 1, . . . , n although the approximation schemes
and technical results can be extended to the case when Ai and Θi are in multi-dimensional
spaces. Let ξ(t) := (1, t, t2, . . .) be the sequence of monominals in t ∈ IR, and denote by ξd(t)
the finite subsequence of the first d+ 1 elements of ξ(t). Thus, any polynomial of degree d can
be represented as vT ξd(t) for v ∈ IRd+1.
Denote by Sid the set of polynomial functions with the highest degree d:
Sid :=
{
s : Θi → Ai : ∃v ∈ IRd+1 such that s(t) = vT ξd(t)
}
for i = 1, . . . , n and let Sd := (S
1
d , . . . , S
n
d ).
We consider an approximation scheme for (BNE′′) by restricting each player’s behavioural
functions to Sid. Consequently, we consider an n-tuple fd := ((fd)1, · · · , (fd)n) such that
(BNE-app) fd ∈ arg max
gd∈Sd
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui((gd)i(θi), (fd)−i(θ−i), θ)]. (4.36)
A significant benefit of formulation (4.36) is that it is a finite dimensional stochastic equilibrium
problem which can be solved relatively more easily. To justify the approximation, we need to
provide theoretical grounding which quantifies the difference between an approximate equilib-
rium and its true counterpart. We start by establishing a relationship between Sd and C in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 The set {Sd} is dense in C in the sense that for every f ∈ C, there exists a sequence
{fd} ⊂ {Sd} such that ‖fd − f‖∞ → 0 as d tends to infinity.
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Proof. Since polynomial functions are continuous, Sd ⊂ C. Without loss of generality, we
assume that Θi = [0, 1]. For any fi ∈ Ci, by the Weierstrass theorem, we can find a sequence of
Bernstein polynomials Bd(θi; fi) of fi, defined as
Bd(θi; fi) :=
d∑
j=0
fi(j/d)
(
d
j
)
θji (1− θi)d−j
such that ‖Bd(θi; fi)− fi‖∞ → 0 as d increases. Observe that
Bd(θi; fi) ≤ bi
d∑
j=0
(
d
j
)
θji (1− θi)d−j = bi,
and likewise
Bd(θi; fi) ≥ ai
d∑
j=0
(
d
j
)
θji (1− θi)d−j = ai.
This shows Bd(θi; fi) ∈ Sid and the rest of conclusion is obvious.
Based on Lemma 4.1, we are ready to show that any cluster point of the sequence of equilibria
obtained from solving (4.36) is an equilibrium of (BNE′′).
Theorem 4.1 (Approximation of BNE by polynomial equilibria) Let {fd} be a sequence
of approximate Bayesian behavioural function equilibria obtained from solving (BNE-app). Then
every cluster point of {fd} is an equilibrium of Bayesian Nash equilibrium problem (3.26).
Proof. Let f be a cluster point and assume without loss of generality that ‖fd − f‖∞ → 0.
Since fd is an equilibrium of problem (4.36), then
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui((gd)i(θi), (fd)−i(θ−i), θ)] ≤
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(fd(θ), θ)], ∀gd ∈ Sd. (4.37)
By Lemma 4.1, polynomials are dense under the topology of infinity norm in the space of
continuous functions on Θ, which is denoted by C. This means that for any function g ∈ C,
there exists a sequence of functions {gd} ⊂ {Sd} such that ‖gd − g‖∞ → 0 as d→∞. Together
with the continuity of ui, we obtain from (4.37) that for any g ∈ C
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(gi(θi), f−i(θ−i), θ)] ≤
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(f(θ), θ)], (4.38)
which implies that f is an equilibrium of problem (3.26).
Theorem 4.1 assumes the existence of polynomial equilibria in (BNE-app) for each fixed d.
In what follows, we investigate the existence. Let us rewrite (4.36) as:
(BNE-app′) V ∗ ∈ arg max
V ∈Vd
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(vTi ξd(θi), (v∗−i)T ξd(θ−i), θ)], (4.39)
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where ξd(θ−i) := (ξd(θj))i 6=j∈N , V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ IR(d+1)×n, Vd = (V1d , . . . ,Vnd ) with V id being
defined as
V id :=
{
vi ∈ IRd+1 : ai ≤ vTi ξd(θi) ≤ bi, ∀θi ∈ Θi
}
. (4.40)
The following lemma shows that V id is compact for i ∈ N .
Lemma 4.2 Let V id be defined as in (4.40). Then V id is a nonempty, convex and compact set
for i ∈ N .
Proof. Non-emptiness is obvious because we can always find a vector vi with the first component
taking a value between ai and bi and the other components being zero. The convexity follows
from the linear system of inequalities in vi. In what follows, we show compactness.
The closeness of V id is obvious. To see boundedness, we select d+1 points θ1i , θ2i , . . . , θd+1i ∈ Θi
with θji 6= θki for j 6= k and consider the following finite system of inequalities:
ai ≤ vTi ξd(θji ) ≤ bi, j = 1, . . . , d+ 1.
The system can be written in a matrix-vector form:
aie ≤ A(θi)vi ≤ bie,
where e denotes the vector in IRd+1 with unit components and A(θi) ∈ IR(d+1)×(d+1) the Van-
dermonde matrix defined as
A(θi) :=

1 θ1i (θ
1
i )
2 . . . (θ1i )
d
1 θ2i (θ
2
i )
2 . . . (θ2i )
d
...
...
... . . .
...
1 θd+1i (θ
d+1
i )
2 . . . (θd+1i )
d
 .
It is well known that A(θi) is nonsingular and hence the set
V˜ i := {vi ∈ IRd+1 : aie ≤ A(θi)vi ≤ bie}
is bounded because the null space defined by A(θi)vi = 0 is {0}. Since V id ⊂ V˜ i, the boundedness
of V id is apparent.
By Lemma 4.2, we can find a convex and compact set Ui ∈ IRd+1 such that V id ∈ Ui for
i ∈ N . Consequently we may write
V id =
{
vi ∈ Ui : ai ≤ vTi ξd(θi) ≤ bi, ∀θi ∈ Θi
}
=
{
vi ∈ Ui : vTi ξd(θi) ∈ Sid
}
(4.41)
and let U := (U1, · · · ,Un). We are now ready to show existence of equilibria for (BNE-app′).
Theorem 4.2 (Existence of polynomial equilibria in (BNE-app′)) Suppose that for i ∈
N , ui(a, θ) is continuous over A × Θ, and ui(ai, a−i, θ) is concave in ai. Then problem (4.39)
has an equilibrium.
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Proof. Let
φ(V,W ) =
n∑
i=1
Eη
[
ui(v
T
i ξd(θi), w
T
−iξd(θ−i), θ)
]
,
for V = (v1, · · · , vn) ∈ IR(d+1)×n and W = (w1, · · · , wn) ∈ IR(d+1)×n. Since ui is continuous
over A × Θ and concave in ai, then φ(V,W ) is continuous and concave in V for each fixed
W . Existence of an optimal solution to maxV ∈Vd φ(V,W ) is ensured by compactness of Vd. To
complete the proof, we only need to show existence of V ∗ such that
V ∗ ∈ arg max
V ∈Vd
φ(V, V ∗).
Denote by Υ(W ) the set of optimal solutions to maxV ∈Vd φ(V,W ). Then Υ(W ) ⊂ Vd. By the
concavity of φ(·,W ), Υ(W ) is a convex set. Moreover, it is easy to show that Υ(W ) is closed,
that is, for W k → W ∗ and Uk ∈ Υ(W k) with Uk → U∗, U∗ ∈ Υ(W ∗). Furthermore, it follows
from [3, Theorem 4.2.1] that Υ(W ) is upper semi-continuous on Vd. By Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem [15], there exists V ∗ such that V ∗ ∈ Υ(V ∗). The proof is complete.
To see how (BNE-app′) works, we apply the approximation scheme to Example 3.1.
Example 4.1 Let d = 1, that is, the behavioural functions are restricted to affine functions
with f1(θ1) = v0 + v1θ1 and f2(θ2) = w0 + w1θ2. We need to find (v
∗
0, v
∗
1, w
∗
0, w
∗
1) such that
(v∗0, v
∗
1) ∈ arg max
(v0,v1)∈V11
∫ 1
−1
[∫ 1
−1
1
4
(v0 + v1θ1)(w
∗
0 + w
∗
1θ2)θ1dθ2 −
1
2
(v0 + v1θ1)
2
]
dθ1 (4.42)
and
(w∗0, w
∗
1) ∈ arg max
(w0,w1)∈V21
∫ 1
−1
[∫ 1
−1
1
4
(w0 + w1θ2)(v
∗
0 + v
∗
1θ1)θ2dθ1 −
1
2
(w0 + w1θ2)
2
]
dθ2, (4.43)
where
V11 := {(v0, v1) : v0 + v1θ1 ∈ [0, 10], θ1 ∈ [−1, 1]}
and
V21 := {(w0, w1) : w0 + w1θ2 ∈ [0, 10], θ2 ∈ [−1, 1]}.
Problems (4.42) and (4.43) are constrained quadratic maximization problems. Through some
maneuvers, the equilibrium problem is down to solving
(v∗0, v
∗
1) ∈ arg max
(v0,v1)∈V11
1
3
v1w
∗
0 − v20 −
1
3
v21 (4.44)
and
(w∗0, w
∗
1) ∈ arg max
(w0,w1)∈V21
1
3
w1v
∗
0 − w20 −
1
3
w21. (4.45)
We can write down the KKT conditions for the two problems and solve the latter to get an
equilibrium. However, we opt for an easier way to identify an equilibrium. For fixed (w10, w
1
1) ∈
V21 , we obtain from solving (4.44) that v10 = v11 = w
1
0
8 . Substituting them to (4.45) and solve the
latter, we obtain w20 = w
2
1 =
v10
8 =
w10
64 . Continuing the process, we deduce that the only solution
to (4.44) and (4.45) is (v∗0, v∗1, w∗0, w∗1) = (0, 0, 0, 0) in that (0, 0, 0, 0) satisfies (4.44) and (4.45) and
the gradients of the two objective functions forms a mapping (−2v0, 13w0− 23v1,−2w0, 13v0− 23w1)
which is strongly monotone (the Jacobian of the mapping is negative definite).
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4.2 Discretization of (BNE-app′)
We now move on to discuss discretization schemes for (BNE-app′) in the case when η is contin-
uously distributed. We consider the approach of optimal quantization of probability measures
due to Pflug and Pichler [18] which identifies a discrete probability measure approximating η
under the Kantorovich metric. Compared to the Monte Carlo methods and Quasi-Monte Carlo
methods, this method has the highest approximation quality with relatively fewer samples; see
comprehensive discussions by Pflug and Pichler [18].
Let L denote the space of all Lipschitz continuous functions h : Ξ → IR with Lipschitz
constant no larger than 1. Let P,Q ∈ P(Ξ) be two probability measures. Recall that the
Kantorovich metric (or distance) between P and Q, denoted by dlK(P,Q), is defined by
dlK(P,Q) := sup
h∈L
{∫
Ξ
h(ξ)P (dξ)−
∫
Ξ
h(ξ)Q(dξ)
}
.
Recall also that {PN} is said to converge to P ∈P weakly if
lim
N→∞
∫
Ξ
h(ξ)PN (dξ) =
∫
Ξ
h(ξ)P (dξ),
for each bounded and continuous function h : Ξ→ IR. An important property of the Kantorovich
metric is that it metrizes weak convergence of probability measures when the support set is
bounded, that is, a sequence of probability measures {PN} converges to P weakly if and only if
dlK(PN , P )→ 0 as N tends to infinity.
Let Θ be a compact set and Θ˜M := {θk, k = 1, . . . ,M} ⊂ Θ be a discrete subset of Θ. We
can define the Voronoi partition {Θ1, . . . ,ΘM} of Θ, where Θi are pairwise disjoint with
Θk ⊆
{
θ ∈ Θ : ‖θ − θk‖ = min
j=1,...,M
‖θ − θj‖
}
.
The possible optimal probability weights pk for minimizing dlK
(
η,
∑M
k=1 pkδθk
)
can then be
found by
p = (p1, . . . , pM ) with pk = η(Θ
k). (4.46)
Let ηM (·) := ∑Mk=1 pkδθk(·) with pk being defined as in (4.46). Following the definition of ηM
and the Kantorovich metric, we have
dlK(η, η
M ) =
∫
min
1≤k≤M
d(θ, θk)dη(θ) =
M∑
k=1
∫
Θk
d(θ, θk)dη(θ) ≤ βM ,
where βM is defined by
βM := max
θ∈Θ
min
1≤k≤M
d(θ, θk) = H(Θ˜M ,Θ).
If βM → 0 as M →∞, then dlK(η, ηM )→ 0, which implies that ηM converges to η weakly.
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Based on the discussions above, we may replace η with ηM in (BNE-app′) and develop a
discretization scheme for the problem: find VM = (vM1 , · · · , vMn ) such that
(BNE-app′-dis) VM ∈ arg max
V ∈VMd
n∑
i=1
EηM
[
ui(v
T
i ξd(θi), (v
M
−i)
T ξd(θ−i), θ)
]
, (4.47)
where
(VMd )i :=
{
vi ∈ Ui : ai ≤ vTi ξd(θi) ≤ bi, ∀θi ∈ Θ˜Mi
}
, (4.48)
with Θ˜M = {θj , j = 1, . . . ,M} ⊂ Θ and Ui being defined as in (4.41). In comparison with
(BNE-app′), the (BNE-app′-dis) model only considers polynomial behavioural functions defined
over a discrete subset Θ˜M of Θ. This might significantly enlarge the feasible set for V , that is,
V id ⊂ (VMd )i.
Let VM be an equilibrium obtained from solving (BNE-app′-dis). In what follows, we in-
vestigate convergence of VM as M goes to infinity. To this end, we discuss convergence of the
feasible set of the maximization problem (4.47) to that of (4.39), that is, (VMd )i to V id. To ease
the exposition, we introduce the following notation.
For any two points W = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ IR(d+1)×n and V = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ IR(d+1)×n, we use
‖W − V ‖ := ∑ni=1 ‖wi− vi‖ to signify the distance between W and V . Let g(vi, θi) := vTi ξd(θi),
ψi(vi) := sup
θi∈Θi
g(vi, θi), ψ
M
i (vi) := sup
j=1,...,M
g(vi, θ
j
i ),
and
ψ˜i(vi) := sup
θi∈Θi
−g(vi, θi), ψ˜Mi (vi) := sup
j=1,...,M
−g(vi, θji ).
Let
Ωi :=
{
vi ∈ Ui : ψi(vi) ≤ bi}, ΩMi = {vi ∈ Ui : ψMi (vi) ≤ bi
}
and
Ω˜i :=
{
vi ∈ Ui : ψ˜i(vi) ≤ −ai}, Ω˜Mi = {vi ∈ Ui : ψ˜Mi (vi) ≤ −ai
}
.
Consequently we can write (VMd )i and V id respectively as
V id = Ωi ∩ Ω˜i, (VMd )i = ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi .
In what follows, we estimate the difference between ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi and Ωi ∩ Ω˜i.
Proposition 4.1 Let V id and (VMd )i be defined as in (4.40) and (4.48). Assume for i ∈ N that
there exist v∗i ∈ Ui and a positive number αi > 0 such that
ψi(v
∗
i )− bi < −αi and ψ˜i(v∗i ) + ai < −αi. (4.49)
Then for i ∈ N
H((VMd )i,V id) ≤
∆iLi
αi
H(Θ˜M ,Θ), (4.50)
where ∆i is the diameter of the set Ωi ∩ Ω˜i, and Li is the uniform Lipschitz modulus of g(vi, θi)
w.r.t. θi over V id.
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In order to prove the proposition, we need the following technical result.
Lemma 4.3 Let T and X be compact sets in some Banach spaces and f(t, x) : T ×X → IR be a
continuous function. Let XK := {x1, · · · , xK} ⊂ X be a discrete subset of X. If f is uniformly
Lipschitz continuous in x with modulus L, then
max
t∈T
∣∣∣∣maxx∈X f(t, x)− maxk=1,··· ,K f(t, xk)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ LH(XK , X). (4.51)
Proof. Let X˜1, · · · , X˜K be the Voronoi partition of X. Then
max
x∈X
f(t, x) = max
k=1,··· ,K
max
x∈X˜k
f(t, x).
Let
R(t) :=
∣∣∣∣ maxk=1,··· ,K maxx∈X˜k f(t, x)− maxk=1,··· ,K f(t, xk)
∣∣∣∣ . (4.52)
Note that for any two bounded sequences {ak}, {bk}, it is well known that∣∣∣∣sup
k
ak − sup
k
bk
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
k
|ak − bk|.
Thus, from (4.52), we have
R(t) ≤ sup
k=1,··· ,K
∣∣∣∣max
x∈X˜k
f(t, x)− f(t, xk)
∣∣∣∣ = maxk=1,··· ,K ∣∣∣f(t, xk∗)− f(t, xk)∣∣∣ ,
where xk∗ denotes the maximizer of f(t, ·) in the Voronoi cell X˜k. Using the uniform Lipschtz
continuity of f in x, we have
R(t) ≤ sup
k=1,··· ,K
L‖xk∗ − xk‖ = sup
k=1,··· ,K
Ld(xk∗, X
K) ≤ LD(X,XK) = LH(X,XK),
where the first equality follows from the definition of the Voronoi partition that xk is the point
from XK which is closest to xk∗, and the last equality is due to the fact that XK ⊂ X.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Note that g(vi, θi) is a polynomial function and U is a compact
set. Thus g(vi, θi) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. θi over Ui with modulus Li. By
Lemma 4.3, we have
sup
vi∈Ui
|ψi(vi)− ψMi (vi)| ≤ LiH(Θ˜M ,Θ)
and
sup
vi∈Ui
|ψ˜i(vi)− ψ˜Mi (vi)| ≤ LiH(Θ˜M ,Θ).
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On the other hand, since ψi and ψ˜i are convex functions, under Slater condition (4.49), we have,
by Robinson’s error bound ([19]), that for any vi ∈ ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi ,
d(vi,Ωi ∩ Ω˜i) ≤ Ci(‖(ψi(vi)− bi)+‖+ ‖(ψ˜i(vi) + ai)+‖)
≤ Ci(‖(ψi(vi)− ψMi (vi))+‖+ ‖(ψ˜i(vi)− ψ˜Mi (vi))+‖)
≤ Ci(‖ψi(vi)− ψMi (vi)‖+ ‖ψ˜i(vi)− ψ˜Mi (vi)‖)
≤ 2CiLiH(Θ˜M ,Θ),
where Ci can be bounded by ∆i/αi and we write (t)+ for max(0, t) with t ∈ IR. Thus
D(ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi ,Ωi ∩ Ω˜i) ≤
2∆iLi
αi
LiH(Θ˜M ,Θ).
Note that Ωi ∩ Ω˜i ⊂ ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi , that is, D(Ωi ∩ Ω˜i,ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi ) = 0. Then
H(Ωi ∩ Ω˜i,ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi ) = D(ΩMi ∩ Ω˜Mi ,Ωi ∩ Ω˜i) ≤
2∆iLi
αi
H(Θ˜M ,Θ).
The proof is completed.
We are now ready to state the main convergence result of this section. Let
φ(V,W ) :=
n∑
i=1
Eη[ui(vTi ξd(θi), wT−iξd(θ−i), θ)]
and
φM (V,W ) :=
n∑
i=1
EηM [ui(vTi ξd(θi), wT−iξd(θ−i), θ)].
We are now ready to state the main result of this section which describes convergence of
approximate polynomial behavioural function equilibria solved from (BNE-app′-dis).
Theorem 4.3 (Convergence of approximate polynomial behavioural function equilibria )
Let {VM} be a sequence of equilibria obtained from solving (BNE-app′-dis). Assume for i ∈ N :
(a) ui(ai, a−i, θ) is Lipschitz continuous in (ai, a−i, θ) with modulus κi, (b) conditions in Propo-
sition 4.1 hold and H(Θ˜M ,Θ)→ 0 as M tends to infinity. Then
(i) any cluster point V ∗ of the sequence {VM} is an equilibrium of (BNE-app′);
(ii) if, in addition, φ(V, V ∗) satisfies some growth condition at V ∗, that is, there exist constants
α > 0 and 0 < ν < 1 such that
−φ(W,V ∗) ≥ −φ(V ∗, V ∗) + α‖W − V ∗‖ν ,∀W ∈ Vd,
and then there exists a positive constant C such that
‖VM − V ∗‖ ≤ C(dlK(η, ηM )) 1ν
when M is sufficiently large;
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(iii) if θ1, · · · , θM are independent and identically distributed with pk = 1M for k = 1, · · · ,M ,
then for any small positive number ε, there exist positive constants C(ε) and λ(ε) such
that
Prob
(
‖VM − V ∗‖ ≥ ε
∣∣∣∣∣‖V ∗ − VM‖ ≤
(
α
4κ(n− 1)K
) 1
1−ν
)
≤ C(ε)e−λ(ε)M
for M sufficiently large, where κ := maxi=1,··· ,n κi and K :=
∑n
i=1 supθi∈Θi ‖ξd(θi)‖. In
the case when
Prob
(
‖V ∗ − VM‖ ≤
(
α
4κ(n− 1)K
) 1
1−ν
)
= 1
for M sufficiently large,
Prob
(‖VM − V ∗‖ ≥ ε) ≤ C(ε)e−λ(ε)M .
Here the probability measure “Prob” is understood as the product of the true (unknown)
probability measure of P over the measurable space Ξ× Ξ× . . . with product Borel sigma-
algebra B ×B × . . . .
Proof. Assume without loss of generality (by taking a subsequence if necessary) that {VM}
converges to V ∗. Let us write
φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM ) = φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗) + φM (V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM ). (4.53)
We estimate the right hand side of (4.53). Since ui is Lipschitz continuous and v
T ξd(θ) is a
polynomial function, ui(v
T
i ξd(θi), v
T
−iξd(θ−i), θ) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. θ for all
v ∈ U . We denote the Lipschitz modulus by Li. Thus
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗)|
≤ sup
V ∈U
n∑
i=1
∣∣Eη[ui(vTi ξd(θi), (v∗−i)T ξd(θ−i), θ)]− EηM [ui(vTi ξd(θi), (v∗−i)T ξd(θ−i), θ)]∣∣
≤ LdlK(η, ηM ), (4.54)
where L =
∑n
i=1 Li. The last inequality follows from the definition of the Kantorovich metric.
Now we turn to estimate φM (V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM ).
|φM (V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM )|
≤
n∑
i=1
∣∣EηM [ui(vTi ξd(θi), (v∗−i)T ξd(θ−i), θ)]− EηM [ui(vTi ξd(θi), (vM−i)T ξd(θ−i), θ)]∣∣
≤
n∑
i=1
κiEηM
[|(v∗−i − vM−i)T ξd(θ−i)|] (using Lipschitz continuity of ui)
≤ κ(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
|(v∗i − vMi )TEηM [ξd(θi)]|
≤ κ(n− 1)K‖V ∗ − VM‖,
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where κ := maxi=1,··· ,n κi and K :=
∑n
i=1 supθi∈Θi ‖ξd(θi)‖. Thus
sup
V ∈U
|φM (V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM )| ≤ κ(n− 1)K‖V ∗ − VM‖. (4.55)
Combining (4.54) and (4.55), we have
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM )| ≤ LdlK(η, ηM ) + κ(n− 1)K‖V ∗ − VM‖. (4.56)
Since VM ∈ arg maxU∈VMd φ
M (U, VM ), then
φM (UM , VM ) ≤ φM (VM , VM ), ∀UM ∈ VMd . (4.57)
Without loss of generality, we assume that UM → U . By Proposition 4.1, U ∈ Vd. Moreover,
by (4.56) and continuity of φ, we have
|φM (VM , VM )− φ(V ∗, V ∗)| = |φM (VM , VM )− φ(VM , V ∗)
+φ(VM , V ∗)− φ(V ∗, V ∗)| → 0, (4.58)
Likewise
|φM (UM , VM )− φ(U, V ∗)| = |φM (UM , VM )− φ(UM , V ∗) (4.59)
+φ(UM , V ∗)− φ(U, V ∗)| → 0.
Hence by driving M →∞, we obtain from (4.57)-(4.60) that
φ(U, V ∗) ≤ φ(V ∗, V ∗).
Since U can be arbitrary in Vd (because Proposition 4.1 ensures that for any U ∈ Vd, we can
find UM ∈ VMd such that UM → U), we arrive at
V ∗ ∈ argmaxU∈Vdφ(U, V ∗),
which implies V ∗ is an equilibrium of (BNE-app′-dis).
Part (ii). By using Lemma 3.1, we have
D(VM ,V∗) ≤
{
3
α
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM )|
} 1
ν
≤
{
3
α
(LdlK(η, η
M ) + κ(n− 1)K‖V ∗ − VM‖)
} 1
ν
(using (4.56)).
When V∗ = {V ∗} and M is sufficiently large with ‖V ∗ − VM‖ ≤
(
α
4κ(n−1)K
) 1
1−ν
, we obtain
‖V ∗ − VM‖ ≤
(
12L
α
dlK(η, η
M )
) 1
ν
. (4.60)
Part (iii). In this case, φM (V, V ∗) is an ordinary sample average approximation of φ(V, V ∗).
Since Θ is compact and ui(v
T
i ξd(θi), (v
∗
−i)
T ξd(θ−i), θ) is Lipschitz continuous in vi for i =
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1, · · · ,M , we may use [21, Theorem 5.1] to establish uniform exponential convergence of φM (V, V ∗)
to φ(V, V ∗). From the proof of Part (ii), we know
‖VM − V ∗‖ν ≤ 3
α
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM )|
≤ 3
α
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗)|+ 3
α
sup
V ∈U
|φM (V, V ∗)− φM (V, VM )|
≤ 3
α
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗)|+ 3
α
κ(n− 1)K‖V ∗ − VM‖ (using (4.55))
≤ 3
α
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗)|+ 3
4
‖V ∗ − VM‖ν
(
when ‖V ∗ − VM‖ ≤
(
α
4κ(n−1)K
) 1
1−ν
)
.
Consequently, we have
‖VM − V ∗‖ ≤
(
12
α
sup
V ∈U
|φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗)|
) 1
ν
.
The rest follows from exponential convergence of supV ∈U |φ(V, V ∗)− φM (V, V ∗)| via [21, Theo-
rem 5.1]. We omit the details.
It might be helpful to add some comments on the theorem. Part (i) is a kind of qualita-
tive convergence statement which guarantees the convergence but is short of giving the rate of
convergence. Part (ii) strengthens the result by giving an explicit error bound for VM under
some growth condition. It is important to note that dlK(η, η
M )
1
ν depends on the dimension of θ
which means when the dimension is high, the bound could be rough, in other words, it is subject
to curse of dimensionality. Part (iii) addresses this issue, it says that when the points of Θ˜M
are given through iid samples, the probability of VM deviating from V ∗ reduces at exponen-
tial rate with increase of the sample size when VM falls into
(
α
4κ(n−1)K
) 1
1−ν
-range of V ∗ with
probability 1. From [21, Theorem 5.1], one can see that the constants C(ε) and λ(ε) depend
on the dimension of V and the size of its domain rather than the dimension of θ. This means
when the dimension of θ is low, we may use the optimal quantization method whereas when
the dimension of θ is high, it might be more efficient to use the well-known sample average
approximation method.
5 Applications to rent-seeking contests
In this section, we apply the theory on existence of equilibria and approximation schemes estab-
lished in the previous sections to rent-seeking contests with incomplete information. There have
been extensive literature on Bayesian behavioural function equilibrium or PSNE for studying
such contests. For instance, Fey [12] considered rent-seeking contests with two players where
each player has private information about his own cost of effort and modelled them as a Bayesian
game where each player’s cost is drawn from a distribution of possible costs. He investigated
existence of equilibria for the cases when the distribution of costs is discrete and continuous.
Ewerhart [10] advanced the research by showing existence of unique PSNE where the contest
success function is of logit form with concave impact functions and each player’s private infor-
mation may relate to either costs or valuations. Ewerhart and Quartieri [11] considered a more
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general class of rent-seeking contests and obtained a sufficient condition for the existence of a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Here we follow primarily Fey’s model.
Consider a rent-seeking contest with n players (n ≥ 2) who aim to choose a level of costly
effort ai ≥ 0 in order to obtain a share of a prize, and each player’s cost is a linear function of
his effort parameterized by θi. The value of θi is drawn from a probability distribution ηi which
is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure over its support set Θi = [αi, βi].
Assuming that θ1, . . . , θn are independent, we can write down the expected utility of player i as
ρi(ai, f−i, θi) := −aiθi +
∫
Θ−i
ai
ai +
∑
j 6=i fj(θj)
dη−i(θ−i) for i ∈ N, (5.61)
where
ui(a, θ) = −aiθi + ai
ai +
∑
j 6=i aj
.
In the case when ai +
∑
j 6=i fj(θj) = 0,
ai
ai+
∑
j 6=i fj(θj)
is set 1n , which means each player gets a
fair 1N if no one makes a positive effort.
Note that by letting ai = 0, player i can obtain a payoff of zero, hence the optimal choice
of ai must satisfy ai ≥ 0 with ρi(ai, f−i, θi) ≥ 0 for all θi ∈ Θi. Moreover, since the integral in
(5.61) is bounded by 1, the optimal choice of ai must satisfy
0 ≤ ai ≤ 1/θi.
Since αi = min{θi : θi ∈ Θi}, then we can define the action space of player i by Ai := [0, 1/αi].
To fit the problem entirely into our framework, we make the action space of each player a
bit more restrictive by considering Ai = [, 1/αi] for some small positive constant . This is
justified in the case when n = 2. To see this, if player i observes his opponent makes zero effort
(f−i = 0), then he would clearly be better off by making a small effort  (the smaller the better
but not equal to zero) with expected profit close to 1. On the other hand, if his rival (player −i)
sees i plays , he would be better off by setting a−i to +δ where δ is a small positive number of
scale, i.e., of scale . Moreover, each player would be better off by keeping its opponent making
positive effort. Fey [12] observed this in the symmetric case and asserted that the observation
applies to symmetric multi-player case. As far as we are concerned, it is unclear whether this is
correct or not in asymmetric situations.
With Ai being defined as above, we consider the following (BNE): find an n-tuple of be-
havioural functions (f 1, · · · , f n) such that
f i (θi) ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ρi(ai, f

−i, θi), ∀θi ∈ Θi (5.62)
for i ∈ N , or equivalently
ρi(f

i (θi), f

−i, θi) ≥ ρi(gi(θi), f −i, θi), ∀θi ∈ Θi,
for any gi : Θi → Ai , where ρi is defined as in (5.61). Existence of Bayesian behavioural function
equilibrium is established by Ewerhart [10, Lemma 3.1]. Here we show that the existence can
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also be verified by our theoretical results in Section 3. To see this, it suffices to verify the
conditions in Assumption 3.1.
From the definition of the problem, we observe that: (a) ui is continuous over A × Θ; (b)
ηi(S|θi) = ηi(S) for any measurable set S ⊂ Θ−i, which implies ηi(S|θi) is continuous in θi; (c)
for any θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
|ρi(ai, f −i, θi)− ρi(ai, f −i, θ′i)| = ai|θi − θ′i| ≤ 1/αi|θi − θ′i|.
Moreover,
(ui)
′
ai(a, θ) = −θi +
∑
j 6=i aj
(ai +
∑
j 6=i aj)2
and
(ui)
′′
ai(a, θ) =
−2∑j 6=i aj
(ai +
∑
j 6=i aj)3
.
Since ai ∈ Ai = [, 1/αi],
(ui)
′′
ai(a, θ) ≤
−2(n− 1)
(
∑n
i=1 1/αi)
3
< 0, (5.63)
which means that ui is strongly concave over Ai . Therefore, all the conditions of Assumption 3.1
are satisfied here. By Theorem 3.2, the problem (5.62) has a continuous behavioural function
equilibrium denoted by (f 1, . . . , f

n).
We now move on to show uniqueness of the equilibrium. It is easy to observe that ui is
convex in a−i in that the second term of ui can be viewed as composition of a convex function
and a linear function of a−i . Moreover, since
∑n
i=1 ui(a, θ) = 1 −
∑n
i=1 aiθi,
∑n
i=1 ui(a, θ) is
concave in a. By [24, Lemma 5], condition (3.33) is satisfied here and hence the uniqueness
follows by Theorem 3.4.
Let {M} be a sequence of small positive numbers which monotonically decreases to zero
as M → ∞. We consider convergence of the corresponding behavioural function equilibrium
fM := (f M1 , . . . , f
M
n ). In [10, Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.4], Ewerhart showed that f
M has a
uniformly converging subsequence which converges to a continuous behavioural function f∗ and
f∗ is a PSNE. Here we draw a slightly stronger conclusion by showing f∗ is indeed a continuous
behavioural function equilibrium in the unconstrained contest (an equilibrium of (5.62) with
 = 0).
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that ηi is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure over Θi
for i ∈ N . Then
(i) there exists some player i such that f∗i (θi) > 0 for all θi ∈ Θi;
(ii) f∗ is a behavioural function equilibrium of problem (5.62) with  = 0.
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Proof. The proof follows essentially from similar proofs of [10, Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.4]. We
include it for completeness. For the simplicity of notation, we assume without loss of generality
that fM converges to f∗.
Part (i). Assume for the sake of a contradiction that for any i ∈ N , there exists a point
θ∗i ∈ Θi such that f∗i (θ∗i ) = 0. By the continuity of f∗i and uniform convergence of fM to f∗, for
any δ > 0, there exist a positive number M0 and a neighborhood B(θ∗i ) of θ∗i such that
f∗i (θi) ≤ δ and fMi (θi) ≤ 2δ, ∀θi ∈ B(θ∗i )
when M ≥M0. On the other hand, by the first order optimality condition,
0 ≥
∫
B(θ∗−i)
∑
j 6=i f
M
j (θj)
(fMi (θi) +
∑
j 6=i f
M
j (θj))
2
dη−i(θ−i)− θi, ∀θi ∈ B(θ∗i ).
Integrating w.r.t. θi over B(θ∗i ) and summing over i = 1, . . . , n, we obtain
0 ≥
∫
B
n− 1∑n
i=1 f
M
i (θi)
dη(θ)−
n∑
i=1
∫
B(θ∗i )
θidηi(θi),
where B = B(θ∗1) × · · · × B(θ∗n). Since fMi (θi) ≤ 2δ over B and δ can be arbitrarily small, the
above inequality does not hold.
Part (ii). Since fM is a behavioural function equilibrium of (5.62) with  = M ,
ρi(f
M
i (θi), f
M
−i , θi) ≥ ρi(ai, fM−i , θi),∀ai ∈ AMi ,
for each fixed θi ∈ Θi. Therefore, if f∗−i > 0 with positive measure, then we may drive M to
infinity and obtain
ρi(f
∗
i (θi), f
∗
−i, θi) ≥ ρi(ai, f∗−i, θi),∀θi ∈ Θi (5.64)
for ai ∈ Ai and i ∈ N . If f∗−i(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i, then by Part (i), f∗i (θi) > 0 for all
θi ∈ Θi. As we commented before, the optimal strategy for the player is to set ai close to 0 but
not zero in which case the expected profit would be close to 1 as opposed to 1/N with ai = 0.
This shows (5.64) still holds for all ai ≥ 0. The proof is complete.
The weakness of this proposition is that we are short of claiming whether or not every
cluster point of {fM} is a continuous behavioural function equilibrium of the unconstrained
contest when the sequence has multiple cluster points.
For the case that  = 0, we can obtain from [12, Theorem 1] that (5.62) has an equilibrium
with continuous behavioural functions. Fey [12] proposed a standard iterative method for solving
(5.62). Here we apply the polynomial decision rule and discretization scheme discussed in Section
4 to model (5.62) with  = 0, which means we solve the following (BNE):
VM ∈ arg max
V ∈VMd
n∑
i=1
EηM
[
−vTi ξd(θi)θi +
vTi ξd(θi)
vTi ξd(θi) +
∑
j 6=i(v
M
j )
T ξd(θj)
]
, (5.65)
where
(VMd )i :=
{
vi ∈ Rd+1 : 0 ≤ vTi ξd(θi) ≤ 1/αi, ∀θi ∈ Θ˜Mi
}
.
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We have carried out numerical tests on a symmetric rent-seeking contest and an asymmetric
one. In the symmetric case, Fey [12] obtained a numerical solution by discretizing the problem
over a grid of 100 elements and believed that it provides a good approximation to the unknown
true equilibrium. Moreover, his focus was on the difference between the equilibrium effort
level under incomplete information and the effort level under complete information. Ewerhart
[10] considered the asymmetric case. Here our focus is how the solution obtained through our
approximation schemes is affected by variation of order of the polynomials d and sample size
M .
In the numerical experiments, we concentrate on two player games and use a heuristic
method, the Gauss-Seidel-type Method [13], to solve problem (5.65). The tests are carried
out in MATLAB 7.10.0 installed on a Dell-PC with Windows 10 operating system and Intel
Core i3-2120 processor.
Algorithm 5.1 Let V 0 = (v01, v
0
2) and set k = 0.
Step 1. For given V k = (vk1 , v
k
2 ), solve
max
v2∈IRd+1
∑M
j=1 pj
(
−vT2 ξd(θj2)θj2 + v
T
2 ξd(θ
j
2)
vT2 ξd(θ
j
2)+(v
k
1 )
T ξd(θ
j
1)
)
s.t. 0 ≤ vT2 ξd(θj2) ≤ 100, j = 1, . . . ,M.
(5.66)
Let vk+12 denote the optimal solution. Then solve
max
v1∈IRd+1
∑M
j=1 pj
(
−vT1 ξd(θj1)θj1 + v
T
1 ξd(θ
j
1)
vT1 ξd(θ
j
1)+(v
k+1
2 )
T ξd(θ
j
2)
)
s.t. 0 ≤ vT1 ξd(θj1) ≤ 100, j = 1, . . . ,M.
(5.67)
Let vk+11 denote the optimal solution.
Step 2. If V k+1 = V k, stop. Otherwise, let V k := V k+1, go to Step 1.
Example 5.1 (Symmetric rent-seeking contests [12]) Let n = 2, Θ1 = Θ2 = [0.01, 1.01],
and A1 = A2 = [0, 100]. Suppose that θ1 and θ2 are independent and uniformly distributed over
Θ1 and Θ2 respectively.
In order to look into the performance of our approximation schemes, we have carried out
two sets of experiments with respect to change of the order of the polynomials d and the sample
size M . We start with fixed sample size M and investigate the performance of the approximate
behavioural function equilibrium as d increases. Figure 1 visualizes changes of the behavioural
functions of both players (they are identical as the game is symmetric), we can see that for
fixed sample size M = 4900, there are sizable shifts of the behavioural function curves over the
interval [0.01, 0.2] as d increases from 5 to 8 but stabilizes after d reaches 8.
We then move on to examine the impact on the approximate behavioural functions at equi-
librium as the sample size M increases for fixed d. Figure 2 displays changes of the behavioural
functions at equilibrium when we change the sample size from 100 to 400, 900 and 1600 with
fixed d = 9. It can be seen from Figure 2 that after M reaches 900, there is no significant change.
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Figure 1: Performance v.s. order of the polynomial d, Example 5.1.
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Figure 2: Performance v.s. sample size M , Example 5.1.
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Throughout the experiments, the samples are chosen by the discretization scheme discussed
in Section 4. For example, in the first set of experiments, we pick up 70 points evenly spread
over Θ1 and Θ2 respectively and use them to form 4900 grid points over the space of Θ1 ×Θ2.
So these samples are generated in a deterministic manner.
Next, we examine the approximation scheme by applying it to an asymmetric rent-seeking
contest with both players having identical expected utility functions and action spaces as in
Example 5.1 but with different type sets.
Example 5.2 (Asymmetric rent-seeking contests) Let n = 2, Θ1 = [0.01, 1.01], Θ2 =
[0.01, 2.01] andA1 = A2 = [0, 100]. As in Example 5.1, we assume that θ1 and θ2 are independent
and uniformly distributed over Θ1 and Θ2 respectively. This example is varied from Ewerhart
[10] where Θ2 = [0.51, 5.51] whereas all other settings are the same.
We have carried out two sets of experiments as in Example 5.1. The results are depicted
in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 visualizes changes of the approximate behavioural functions at
equilibrium for player 1 and player 2 when the order of the polynomials d increases from 5 to
8 with fixed sample size M = 5000. Figure 4 depicts changes of the approximate behavioural
functions at equilibrium when the sample size M changes from 72 to 392 with fixed order of the
polynomials d = 8. Note that different from Example 5.1, the size of interval Θ2 is twice of Θ1,
so we pick up K points and 2K points evenly from Θ1 and Θ2 with K = 6, 10, 13, 14 and use
them to generate K × 2K grid points/samples.
The preliminary numerical tests show that our approximation schemes work very well. Note
that it is possible to reformulate problem (5.65) into a nonlinear complementarity problem
(NCP) through first order optimality conditions and consequently we may replace Algorithm
5.1 with an existing NCP solver such as PATH. Since the reformulation is equivalent, it does
not affect the test results but may avoid the iterative process.
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